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1.  Introduction 
 
The “regulated conduct defence” shields conduct from competition law2 consequences where it is 
required by a federal or state regulation. When firms invoke the doctrine as a defence against allegations of 
illegal anti-competitive behaviour, they seek a regulated conduct defence or regulated conduct exemption.3
The regulated conduct defence is important to ensure that the state can exercise its sovereign power to 
apply regulation that it deems justified for economic and/or social reasons even though the regulation may 
conflict with competition policy.
 
The defence has direct links with several legal doctrines that lead to the non-application of competition law 
in some circumstances: express immunity, implied immunity, or the state action doctrine.  
4
The regulated conduct defence carries, however, also important risks and, with them, high potential 
costs for society. Indeed, the defence may lead to the application of regulation that is unduly anti-
competitive and entails a welfare cost not justified to achieve the objective of the regulation.
 The defence is also important to ensure firms do not face multiple and 
inconsistent legal demands, in particular from regulations and competition law. The risks of such 
inconsistent legal demands are particularly important given the wide applicability of competition law and 
its evolving interpretations. In the specific case where the regulatory structure has the same goals as 
competition law, the regulated conduct defence may also be justified on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis 
when there is no added-value to apply competition law in addition to regulation. 
5
This paper will emphasise a number of key points: 
 Government 
restraints on competition may be as harmful to consumer welfare as private restraints. This will be 
particularly the case if the regulation results from the lobbying by private interests, which may be more 
common in period of economic downturn. The defence may also lead to an exemption from competition 
law oversight of a conduct that is only weakly regulated by the state. 
• Regulations can at times require actions that would, absent the regulation, constitute potential 
violations of competition law. 
                                                     
1  This paper was prepared by Alexandre de Streel, Professor at the University of Namur 
(alexandre.destreel@fundp.ac.be). 
2 The paper does not deal with the state aid rules that are applicable in some jurisdictions. 
3 Related terms include the regulated industries exemption, regulated industries defence and regulated 
industries doctrine. See Competition Bureau of Canada (2010, p.1). 
4 As observed by Carlton and Picker (2007, p.15), regulated conduct defence may move competition from 
the market to the legislative bodies. 
5 See OECD (2011a) and OECD (2011b). The OECD Competition Assessment Toolkit aims at identifying 
regulation that unnecessarily restricts competition beyond what is necessary to achieve the regulatory goal. 
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• One way to avoid inconsistent demands on companies is through sector exemptions, but these are 
typically overbroad and better tailored solutions exist. The regulated conduct defence offers a 
narrower form of immunity than exempting an entire sector from the application of competition 
law. 
• The application of the regulated conduct defence is more complex in multi-level governance 
settings as different legal principles may collide.  
• The regulated conduct defence should only apply where companies have no autonomy over their 
behaviour. 
• In some jurisdictions competition rules enacted at federal level prevent state regulators from 
imposing or facilitating conduct that would otherwise violate competition rules. 
• The regulated conduct defence may be invoked as a defence in merger cases. 
• Institutional settings can play an important role in reducing potential inconsistencies between the 
design and the enforcement of regulatory structures and competition law. 
• The regulated conduct defence may entail substantial welfare costs for society and should therefore 
be applied by courts with caution. 
This background note is organised as follows. Section 2 is a general introduction and deals with the 
rationale for the regulated conduct defence and the risks for consumer welfare. This Section characterises 
the main differences between competition rules and regulation, the different relationships between both 
sets of rules and the scope for a regulated conduct defence. Sections 3 and 4 go into more detail concerning 
the conditions of application of the regulated conduct defence in the two main branches of competition 
policy: on the one hand, anti-competitive agreements and abuses of dominant position/monopolization 
cases, and on the other hand, merger review. Section 5 then moves from substantive to institutional issues. 
It deals with possible measures to alleviate or reduce harmful conflict in the design and the enforcement of 
regulation and competition rules. Finally, Section 6 briefly concludes. 
2.  The regulated conduct defence: rationale and risks6
2.1 The objectives and the tools of competition rules and regulation 
 
Competition law has the specific goal of making markets work better for the benefit of consumers. 
Competition law provides two main prohibition tools: (i) prohibition of anti-competitive agreements and 
abuses of a dominant position (or monopolization) so as to impede the harm for consumers that would 
result from artificial increases in market power; and (ii) prohibition of mergers that would substantially 
lessen effective competition. In most jurisdictions, they apply uniformly to all economic sectors, unless 
specified otherwise. 
Regulation is a much broader concept that may have very different economic or non economic 
objectives.7 It relies on a variety of instruments and usually is more prescriptive than competition law8
                                                     
6 This section draws heavily from the work of the International Competition Network, see ICN (2004a). 
: 
7 Baldwin and Cave (1999, Chapter 1), Breyer (1982, Chapter 1). 
8 As noted by ICN (2005, p.7): “the emphasis of competition law is on what undertakings should not do, 
whereas regulation does the reverse and tells market agents what to do”. 
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• Regulation may correct market failures and, as competition law, make markets work better to the 
benefit of the consumers: 
− It may reduce transaction costs, via rules related to property rights or contracts. 
− It may address information asymmetries among economic agents that are not easily corrected 
by experience, such as rules ensuring minimum quality standards or preventing consumer 
harm. 
− It may address externalities, i.e. situations where economic agents neglect the spill-over 
effects of their decisions on third parties, which may be positive (such as in case of 
education) or negative (such as in case of pollution, traffic congestion and of financial market 
instability). 
− It may permanently address structural market power when the characteristics of the sector 
prevent effective competition (e.g. a natural monopoly). In this case, regulation may aim at 
mimicking the result of effective competition with, for example, retail price controls. 
− It may also temporarily address market power when the sector is being liberalised but the 
application of competition rules is not sufficient to ensure a competitive market. In this case, 
regulation may steer the sector towards effective competition through structural (vertical 
separation) or behavioural (compulsory third-party access) obligations.9
• Regulation may address distributional issues, such as ensuring the provision of minimum or 
universal services to all consumers at affordable prices. In those circumstances, regulation may 
sacrifice efficiency to increase equity, but then the regulation should try minimizing the efficiency 
costs to society.
 This is for instance 
the case of the EU electronic communications regulatory framework discussed in Box 1.  
10 For instance in the EU, the provision of telecommunications universal service is 
intended not to distort competition and should minimise market distortions.11
• Regulation may address many other issues, such as health, safety standards and risk. 
 
Regulation may at times suffer from failures.12 It may go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
public interest objectives and impose a welfare cost that is not commensurate to the public interest.13
                                                     
9 On structural separation measures, see the OECD Council Recommendation on Structural Separation 
(OECD, 2001) and the Report on the Implementation of the Recommendation on Structural Separation 
(OECD, 2011c). 
 This 
is particularly the case when regulation results from the lobbying of private parties to favour their own at 
the expense of the general interest (regulatory capture). For instance, regulation may serve as a 
coordinating mechanism for a cartel. Moreover, there is a potential for economic distortions to arise, as 
different sectors are subject to different regulatory environments. Such distortions can have a negative 
10 On this issue, see OECD (2004). 
11 Directive 2002/22 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and 
users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, OJ [2002] L 108/51 as amended 
by Directive 2009/136, Art. 1(2) and 3(2), and Case C-220/07, Commission v France [2008] E.C.R. I-95, 
paras.29 and 31. 
12 Peltzman (1976) and (1989), Stigler (1971). 
13 For some examples, see the contributions in Amato and Laudati (2001). 
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impact on economic welfare by distorting consumer decisions as to which products and services they 
purchase. In addition, regulation may quickly become out-of-date, especially in fast-moving industries for 
technological reasons that are not directly connected with the legal regime, or where liberalisation has 
begun and some companies are moving fast to adapt to the new situation. 
From a public interest perspective, it is therefore important that regulation applies only when its 
economic and social benefits outweigh its costs. Potential regulatory failures may in some cases imply that 
effective competition and competition policy may be a better solution than regulation. 
According to Carlton and Picker (2007, p.51): “The relative advantages and disadvantages of each 
mechanism became clearer over time. Regulation produced cross-subsidies and favours to special interests, 
but was able to specify prices and specific rules of how firms should deal with each other. Antitrust, 
especially when it became economically coherent within the past 30 years or so, showed itself to be 
reasonably good at promoting competition, avoiding the favouring of special interests, but not good at 
formulating specific rules for particular industries. The partial and full deregulation movement was a 
response to the recognition of the relative advantages of regulation and competition law. This does not 
mean that no sector will be regulated, but rather that competition, constrained only by competition law, 
will be used over more activities, even in regulated industries”. According to Temple Lang (2008, at 
section II) “competition law gives power only to stop already identifiable illegal actions, whether by 
companies or State measures, while regulation gives power to alter an existing situation which is entirely 
legal, to promote regulatory objectives. Regulatory powers, or competition law powers being used or 
misused for regulatory purposes, therefore create a temptation to “improve” the existing market”14
Box 1. The EU electronic communications economic regulation 
. 
In 2002, the European Union substantially changed the economic regulation of the electronic communications 
sector. The goal of the reform was to render economic regulation closer to economic realities, technologically neutral, 
flexible and more harmonised between the Member States. According to the Framework Directive15
First, the regulatory authority selects, on the basis of Recommendation from the European Commission, the 
markets justifying possible regulation on the basis of three cumulative criteria: (i) the existence of high and non-
transitory barriers to entry of a structural, legal or regulatory nature; (ii) a market structure that, taking account of the 
barriers to entry, will not tend towards effective competition within the relevant time horizon of the market analysis (2-3 
years); and (iii) the insufficiency of competition law alone to adequately address the market failure(s) present on the 
market. Then, the regulatory authority defines the product and geographical boundaries of the selected markets 
according to the antitrust methodologies relying on the so-called SSNIP (small but significant non-transitory increase in 
price) test; 
, the national 
regulatory authorities follow three steps to regulate a market. Such steps should be applied prospectively and repeated 
every 2-3 years to take into account market developments. 
Second, the regulatory authority analyses the market to determine whether one or several operators enjoy 
significant market power, which is equivalent to the dominant position in competition law; 
Third, the regulatory authority imposes on the operators having significant market power the most appropriate 
and proportionate regulatory obligations provided in EU law Directives, such as transparency, non-discrimination, 
                                                     
14 On a comparison between antitrust rules and regulation in terms of substance and processes, see also Katz 
(2004, p.245-246), Laffont and Tirole (2000). 
15 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ [2002] L 108/33, as 
amended by Directive 2009/140, Art.14-16 and European Commission (2002). See Garzaniti and O’Regan 
(2010, Chapter 1), Monti (2003), de Streel (2003). 
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accounting separation, third-party access, price control, or functional separation. 
This competition-based regulation has several advantages. It is more flexible and guarantees that national 
regulatory authorities’ decisions are based on sound economic principles and reflect the reality of the market. It 
ensures a progressive removal of obligations as competition develops on the relevant markets (market-by-market 
sunset clauses) and facilitates the transition towards the mere application of competition law. Such an approach 
requires close co-operation between regulatory and competition authorities. 
2.2 The relationship between competition law and regulation 
When a business conduct is directly or indirectly affected by regulation, a conflict may exist between 
the implementation of the regulation and the enforcement of antitrust rules.  
2.2.1 Complementarity of regulation and competition law 
In most cases, competition law and regulation enforcement pursue distinct objectives, use different 
tools and affect different aspects of business conduct. Therefore, the two instruments complement each 
other and may be applied cumulatively.  
For instance, regulation aimed at limiting pollution does not reduce the need for the competition law 
prohibition of anti-competitive agreements, abuses of a dominant position or anti-competitive mergers. 
Similarly, mandatory labelling or the prohibition of misleading advertising aim at promoting transparency 
and increasing the ability of consumers to choose among different alternatives, complementing competition 
law in ensuring an effective competitive discipline.  
The complementary role of competition law and regulation is also evident in recently liberalised 
sectors where the role of regulation has changed radically. Historically, regulation was responsible for 
issuing licences and setting prices. Now in certain liberalised sectors, regulation is increasingly based on 
competition analysis and respects market forces. As stated by M. Monti (2003), a previous EU 
Commissioner for competition policy, “competition instruments and regulatory tools are complementary 
means. They deal with a common problem and try to achieve a common aim. The problem is high levels of 
market power and the likelihood of it being abused, and the aim is putting the end user at the centre of any 
economic activity”16
2.2.2 Substitutability of regulation and competition law 
. Both legal instruments have specific characteristics: Regulation focuses only on the 
main aspects of business conduct (for instance, access or final pricing), providing the ex-ante framework 
that regulated firms need to follow. Competition law prohibitions on agreements and abuses are expressed 
in more general terms and are enforced ex-post. The prohibition of abuse of a dominant position, for 
example, seeks to impede behaviour that may distort competition and is not specifically covered by 
regulation. In most jurisdictions, when an industry or a firm is regulated, competition law enforcement 
represents an additional tool, with the baseline being determined by regulation. 
In some cases, however, the application of both competition law rules and regulation is incompatible 
as regulation may restrict competition (for example by establishing entry barriers) or impose behaviours 
that may be condemned under competition law (for example fixing minimum prices). In such cases, 
regulation may imply an exemption to the application of competition law. 
Such exemption may be beneficial to the society when the regulation aims to correct market failure or 
ensure distributional objectives, while at the same time the possible anti-competitive effects are reduced to 
                                                     
16 Also see the remarks of the current U.S. Assistant Attorney General Varney (2010, p.14). 
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the minimum. If, however, regulation goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the underlying public 
interest objectives, the competition law exemption is detrimental. 
It is thus important that exemptions to competition law apply only when the economic and social 
benefits of the exemption outweigh its costs. That is why the OECD (1997, p. 271) has taken the position 
that exemptions from the general competition law should be minimized or even eliminated: “As a general 
reform strategy, governments should expand the scope and effectiveness of competition policy. The scope 
and effectiveness of competition law and competition authorities should be reviewed, and strengthened 
where necessary. Exemptions to competition law should be eliminated, absent evidence of compelling 
public interests that cannot be served in better ways.”17
Thus where a specific rationale for exemptions has been identified, consideration should be given to 
the means by which its scope can be minimized. For example, an exemption which is narrow and focussed 
is better than a broad exemption. In the same vein, a legislated monopoly requiring all producers of a 
particular commodity to sell to a particular licensed exporter may be an inferior substitute to a system that 
allows producers to engage in co-operative export selling arrangements, but does not compel them to do 
so. 
 
This is now clearly understood in most jurisdictions where the solution to “exempt” the whole 
regulated sector from the application of competition law has been progressively abandoned for several 
reasons18 (i) technical progress has allowed competition in many previous natural monopoly environments 
and justified liberalization in several network industries, (ii) competition law has increasingly been 
recognised as a more suitable  regulator given the limitations of industry regulation and (iii) the increased 
use of economics in competition law analysis has allowed for an improved balance between pro and anti-
competitive effects.19
If the broad sector exemption is not applicable, the issue is whether and at what conditions a specific 




2.3 The scope of the regulated conduct defence 
 the conditions for a regulated conduct defence should be strictly designed.  
In practice, the courts have restricted the use of the regulated conduct defence in order to diminish its 
risk and potential costs for society. The courts have generally accepted the regulated conduct defence when 
the firm’s contested behaviour is the policy choice of a sovereign government. However, it has not been 
accepted where private parties have invoked it in order to manipulate the democratic process in such a way 
as to give themselves effective, unsupervised control over a market.21
                                                     
17 Also see OECD (2005a, p.12). 
 As noted by ICN (2004a, p. 4), 
“Antitrust enforcement, unless there is a specific exemption, is always possible when there is a restriction 
of competition which falls under the prohibition of the antitrust law and this restriction may be attributed to 
an autonomous firm decision, i.e. it is not mandated by regulation. In some jurisdictions antitrust rules may 
also be applied when the anticompetitive regulation is clearly not in the general interest and it delegates the 
power to implement its provisions to the regulated firms themselves”.  
18 See Baldwin and Cave (1999, Chapter 10), Breyer (1982, at Parts II and III), Cooper and Kovacic (2010, 
p.1558). On the means and the benefits to bring competition to regulated sectors, see OECD (2005a). 
19 On that last point, see in particular Varney (2010). 
20 Carlton and Picker (2007, p.16). 
21 Hovenkamp (2005, at §18.5). 
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The regulated conduct defence has different conditions and implications depending on whether it is 
relied upon in an ex-post or an ex-ante antitrust case. Both types of cases will be considered in the 
following two sections. 
3.  The regulated conduct defences in anti-competitive agreements and monopolization or 
abuses of dominant position cases 
In cases involving anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position or monopolization 
cases, the regulated conduct defence is based on several doctrines that allow exemption from competition 
law under some conditions. These doctrines are mainly of a legal nature and do not always meet strict 
economic efficiency criteria. They have been developed pragmatically on a case-by-case basis without 
drawing on a fully coherent framework. One of the main criteria for allowing an exemption from 
competition law is whether the regulation was taken at the same level as the competition law or at an 
inferior level. This paper deals with both questions in turn in the following two sub-sections. 
3.1 Regulated conduct defence when regulation is at the same legal level as competition law 
3.1.1 Explicit legislative regulated conduct defence and immunity to antitrust 
The regulated conduct defence may be based on an explicit exemption from competition law. Such 
immunity may be provided by the competition law itself or by a regulation when adopted at the same level 
as the competition law. Exemption may vary in intensity: it may provide limited competition law immunity 
for specific conduct or types of agreements between firms, it may apply to narrow areas but provide a 
broader immunity, it may apply broadly but provide a limited immunity or it may create a broad immunity 
for entire areas. 
In the U.S., the competition law provisions are contained in federal and state acts. The federal 
competition law, which the Supreme Court has called “the Magna Carta of free enterprise”22
Some federal regulatory acts, however, provide for an express immunity to the federal competition 
law provisions either directly or by giving a federal agency the authority to grant competition law 
immunity via administrative decision.
, generally 
applies to interstate commerce or any activity affecting interstate commerce, whether or not the conduct at 
issue is subject to state or federal regulation. 
23 In general, such explicit exemptions are strictly construed,24 which 
has been welcomed by the bi-partisan Antitrust Modernization Commission.25 There are more than thirty 
statutory competition law exemptions and they relate mainly to the following sectors: agriculture and 
fishing, maritime or railroads transport26, banking, insurance and financial services, sport leagues, 
professional societies, export cartels, labour, healthcare, education.27
                                                     
22 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 According to the Antitrust 
23 See Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007, p.347-356), Carlton and Picker (2007, p.16-19), 
Hovenkamp (2005, at §19.7). 
24 FMC v. Seatrain Lines, 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973) construing the exemption so as to cover operating 
agreements but not mergers. 
25 Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007, p.356: Recommendation 61). 
26 Shipping Act of 1984, 46 USCA § 1706. Motor carrier Act of 1980, 49 USCA § 10706(b); Staggers Rail 
Act of 1980, 49 USCA § 17706(a) permit firms to engage in joint rate making without violating antitrust 
provisions against collusion. 





In the EU, the competition provisions are contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), which is the constitutional Charter of the EU
 “Statutory immunities (…) should be granted rarely, and only where, and 
for so long as, a clear case has been made that the conduct in question would subject the actors to antitrust 
liability and is necessary to satisfy a specific societal goal that trumps the benefit of a free market to 
consumers and the U.S. economy in general.” 
29 and in the laws of the Member States. EU 
competition rules apply to private and public “undertakings”, which have been defined by the Court of 
Justice as every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of its legal status or the way it is 
financed.30
EU competition law applies to all sectors of the economy with very rare exemptions. The TFEU 
provides for a possible exemption in the agricultural sector.
 Economic activity, in turn, depends on the function carried out by the entity, and consists of 
offering goods or services on the market where that activity could, at least in principle, be carried out by 
private undertakings in order to make profits. Thus EU competition law applies to all entities, private or 
public, that offer products or services normally provided against remuneration. Conversely, competition 
law does not apply to activities where the Member states exercise sovereign power (such as control of air 
space, anti-pollution surveillance) or that are governed by the principle of solidarity such as compulsory 
social security insurance schemes (for examples in the healthcare sector, see Box 2). 
31 However, the Council of Ministers decided to 
make competition law applicable to agriculture with certain exemptions to Article 101 TFEU in order to 
ensure a proper functioning of the Common Agricultural Policy and its national organizations of 
agricultural markets32. The TFEU also provides for exemptions for nuclear energy and military 
equipment.33 The Council also provides for an exemption to Article 101 TFEU for certain agreements in 
rail, road and inland waterway transport aiming at technical improvements or achieving technical 
cooperation.34 Thus, in all other sectors, competition law applies fully. The European Commission, 
however, adopted several block exemptions for certain economic sectors: motor vehicle, insurance, and 
transport (air, maritime). In those cases, competition law applies, but the agreements meeting the 
conditions set by the Commission are automatically exempted on the basis of Article 101(3) TFEU. The 
Commission has also adopted cross-sectoral block exemptions for some types of horizontal (research and 
development, and specialisation) agreements, vertical agreements and Technology Transfer agreements.35
Moreover, the Treaty provides that competition rules do not apply to economic activities when it is 
necessary for the provision of services of general economic interest (SGEI)
 
36
                                                     
28 Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007, p.350: Recommendation 57). 
 as explained below. 
29 Case C-294/83, Les Verts v. European Parliament ECR [1986] 1339, at para.23. 
30 Case C-41/90 Hofner and Elser v. Macroton [1991] I-1979. 
31 Art. 42 TFEU. 
32 Council Regulation 1184/2006 of 24 July 2006 applying certain rules of competition to the production of, 
and trade in, agricultural products, O.J. [2006] L 214/7. See Whish (2008, p. 957-961). 
33 Art. 346(1b) TFEU. See Whish (2008, p. 957). 
34 Council Regulation 169/2009 of 26 February 2009 applying rules of competition to transport by rail, road 
and inland waterway, OJ [2009] L 61/1. 
35 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html. 
36 Article 106(2) TFEU. 
 DAF/COMP(2011)3 
 29 
Box 2. The provision of healthcare services 
There have been a number of interesting cases concerning the provision of healthcare services which have 
raised questions about how the involvement of the state effects the application of competition law. 
In 2006 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in FENIN37 held that public bodies acting as purchasers of medical 
supplies did not constitute ‘undertakings’, and therefore Articles 101 and 102 TFEU did not apply to them. FENIN is an 
association of undertakings involved in the marketing of medical goods used in Spanish hospitals. FENIN had 
complained to the European Commission (EC) that the public bodies managing the Spanish health service had abused 
their dominant position as purchasers of the medical goods produced by FENIN’s members. The ECJ agreed with the 
earlier judgment of the General Court (GC) and confirmed that “it is the activity of offering goods and services on a 
given market which determines whether an activity is economic, not purchasing as such.”38
The earlier FENIN case before the GC came out a short time after the UK BetterCare II case that also involved 
abuse of dominance claims in the provision of healthcare. Some interesting parallels can be drawn. Indeed, the OFT 
was motivated to publish a note to emphasise the different reasoning of the two tribunals.
 
39 The BetterCare cases 
concerned a provider of residential and nursing home care who had complained to the OFT that the purchaser, a 
Health and Social Services Trust (N&W), was abusing its dominant position.  The OFT rejected the complaint on the 
grounds that N&W was not an undertaking for the purposes of the Competition Act 1998. However, on appeal, the 
Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT) decided that N&W was acting as an undertaking, both through the purchasing of 
services from BetterCare and the direct provision of elderly care by its own statutory homes. In its policy note the OFT 
sets out the principle differences between the two cases which allowed the CAT to come to its seemingly divergent 
decision.40
The provision of healthcare services in the UK is now able to benefit from the newly formed Co-operation and 
Competition Panel (CPP). The CPP is an independent, non-statutory advisory body that was established by the 
Secretary of State to provide advice to the Department of Health, Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) and other NHS 
bodies. The CPP has no concurrent powers to enforce competition law as this responsibility remains with the OFT. 
 In particular it was emphasised that while the GC held that the characteristic of an economic activity does 
not include the business of purchasing, the CAT’s key consideration was whether an entity is in a position to generate 
the effects which competition rules seek to prevent. The OFT concludes that where a public body is only a purchaser 
of goods or services in a particular market, and is therefore not involved in the direct provision of any goods or services 
in that, or any related market, it will not be an undertaking for the purposes of the Competition Act 1998. However, the 
legal position regarding bodies that both purchase and directly provide goods for non-economic purposes (as is often 
the case in the provision of healthcare services) was stated as unclear and in a state of development pending the final 
judgment in FENIN.   
41  
However, it does have the power to advise and undertake cases concerning the Principles and Rules of Cooperation 
and Competition (PRCC)42
In the 2007 Baxter case in Australia ACCC v Baxter [2007] HCA 38, it was asserted before the court that 
competition law did not apply to health care procurements by the States operating hospitals, despite the fact the 
suppliers were private sector organisations.  The ACCC had accepted that the tender and procurement of sterile fluid 
products by the purchasing authorities did not amount to carrying on a business.  This meant that the purchasing 
authorities themselves were not bound by the Trade Practices Act (TPA), now the Competition and Consumer Act 
2010.  However, Baxter as a private sector organisation had linked competitive products to monopoly products and 
was therefore able to supply both on a non-competitive basis.  Baxter argued that derivative crown immunity applied, 
and therefore the TPA could not apply to Baxter as this would affect the freedom of the Crown to enter into contracts of 
its choosing.  The High Court did not agree, and the majority held that Crown immunity does not automatically extend 
to third parties unless that immunity is clearly necessary to protect the Crown’s proprietary contractual legal rights.  
.   
                                                     
37 Case C-205/03, FENIN v Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR I-6295. 
38 See above, para 24 of ECJ judgment. 
39 See Policy note 1/2004, The Competition Act and public bodies available at: 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/ca98_mini_guides/oft443.pdf. 
40 See above, para 13. 




Baxter’s activity of supplying State health purchasing authorities was therefore not immune from the TPA.  The 
decision of the High Court clarifies that companies are subject to the TPA, irrespective of whether the TPA also applies 
to the other party to the arrangement and companies will not automatically receive the protection of any Crown 
immunity when dealing with Commonwealth, State or Territory authorities. 
 
In Australia, the competition provisions are included in a federal law (the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010) and several regulations adopted at the federal level provide for an exception to the competition 
law. The main sectors concerned are: postal, banking, financial and insurance services (see Box 8), and 
customs.43
In Singapore, the Competition Act of 2004’s prohibitions against anti-competitive conduct does not 
apply to the government, any statutory body, or person acting on behalf of the government. Moreover, the 
Act creates a number of sector exclusions, such as for postal, rail, and cargo services while in some other 
areas, competition oversight of sector-specific businesses has been exempted (e.g., telecoms, media, and 
energy). 
  
In China, the Anti-Monopoly Law creates immunities from competition law for state owned 
enterprises in strategic sectors such as aviation, banking, electricity, oil, railroads, and 
telecommunications.44
Two concerns have, however, been raised by SAIC (the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce) concerning its inability to act in these areas.
 In these sectors it is therefore the industry regulatory authorities that have power to 
take action against any anticompetitive behaviour.   
45
3.1.2 Implicit judicial regulated conduct defence and immunity to competition law 
 First, the industry regulatory authorities usually 
have a close relationship with the enterprises under their ambit. This may give rise to conflict of interest 
issues impairing the protection of consumer interests and rights. Second, there have been some 
inconsistencies in the level of sanctions that regulatory authorities can administer. An example of this can 
be seen under the Telecommunications Regulations, stipulating that fines for anticompetitive behaviour 
will be between Rmb 10,000 and Rmb 100,000. These are, however, considerably lower than the fines 
administered under the Anti-unfair Competition Law which range from Rmb 50,000 to Rmb 200,000.   
A regulated conduct defence may also be based on antitrust immunity not explicitly provided by the 
competition or regulatory law, but which is implicitly in the law and deduced by the courts. 
In the U.S., the regulated conduct defence based on implicit immunity requires plain repugnancy 
between the competition law and regulatory provisions and is strictly construed.46
                                                     
43 The federal exceptions are listed on the website of ACCC : 
 The courts will look at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/688173: Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989 , 
Banking Act 1959 , Customs Act 1901, Financial Sector (Business Transfer and Group Restructure) Act 
1999 , Insurance Act 1973, Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984, Northern Territory National Emergency 
Response Act 2007, Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998, Payment Systems (Regulation) Regulations 
2006, Trade Practices Act 1974, s. 173. 
44 See Fox (2008). 
45 See China’s contribution to 2005 GFC on the Relationship between Competition Authorities and Sectoral 
Regulators. DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2005)9. 
46 United States v. Philadelphia national Bank, 374 U.S. 321 at 350-351 (1963). ICN (2004b, p.21). 
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four elements:47 (i) The existence of regulatory authorities to supervise the challenged conduct; (ii) The 
evidence that the regulatory authorities exercise the supervision with the suitable degree of attentiveness,48
In practice, the courts have accepted a regulated conduct defence based on implied competition law 
exclusion only in limited instances, in particular in securities regulation supervised by the SEC.
 
this condition requires that the challenged conduct should have been investigated by a public regulatory 
agency or possibly approved after a fairly full review of the merits; (iii) The risk of conflicting 
requirements between competition law and regulation, for instance because both legal instruments have 
different and conflicting objectives; and (iv) a conduct squarely within the heartland of regulation. 
49
Moreover, when there is rate regulation at the federal (or the state level, see below), the Supreme 
Court allows implied immunity limited to some sanctions under the “filed rate doctrine.”
 The 
courts tend to exempt, according to the proportionality principle, only to the minimum extent necessary to 
make the regulatory statute work.  
50
In Canada, the Competition Bureau (2010, p. 7) indicates that “it will not pursue a matter under any 
provision of the (Competition) Act where Parliament has articulated an intention to displace competition 
law enforcement by establishing a comprehensive regulatory regime and providing a regulator the 
authority to itself take, or to authorize another to take, action inconsistent with the (Competition) Act, 
provided the regulator has exercised its regulatory authority in respect of the conduct in question”, and that 
it “will generally conclude that the enactment by Parliament of specific provisions to address the conduct 
in question is intended to take precedence over a law of general application such as the Competition Act 
i.e. application of the generalia specialibus non derogant maxim”. 
 The doctrine 
forbids purchasers from lodging competition law complaints concerning prices fixed by suppliers, where 
those suppliers have duly filed their rates with the regulatory authority and the rates have not been 
disapproved by the authority. 
3.1.3 A hybrid analysis when regulation complements competition law 
In Trinko,51
                                                     
47 National Gerimedical Hospital v. Blue Cross of Kansas City 452 U.S. 378, 388 (1981); Silver v. NYSE 373 
U.S. 341; Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 659 (1975); Credit Suisse Securities (USA) v. 
Billing 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
 the U.S. Supreme Court decided that federal competition law could not be the basis for a 
duty to deal of a telecommunications incumbent operator subject to an access obligation under the federal 
telecommunications laws. This was not a case of express or implied immunity due to the antitrust saving 
clause of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.  The Supreme Court did, however, a cost-benefit analysis and 
considered that there was no added-value to apply competition law in addition to regulation which follows 
the same logic and follows more ambitious goals than competition law. The Supreme Court states that, 
where such regulatory structure exists, the benefit of an additional application of competition law is small 
as both legal instruments have objectives going in the same direction while the cost of applying 
competition law may be high as the authority deciding under competition law (in this case, a judicial court 
which is not well equipped to deal with the complex issues underlying access obligations) may make errors 
and condemn practices that are competitive. 
48 According to Hovenkamp (2005, at §19.3c), the same standard of regulatory supervision should apply for a 
antitrust exemption in case of federal regulation and in case of state regulation.  
49 Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 659 (1975). 
50 Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, 260 U.S. 156 (1922). 
51 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 682 (2004). 
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According to the Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007, p. 362), “The Court simply held that 
the specific, regulatory duties to deal established under the 1996 Telecommunications Act did not also 
create a new cause of action under the refusal-to-deal doctrine of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Trinko is 
best understood only as a limit on refusal-to-deal claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. It should not 
be read to displace the role of the antitrust laws in regulated industries as an implied immunity, nor should 
it be taken as a judicial rejection of a savings clause”.52
3.2 Regulated conduct defence when regulation is at an inferior level than competition law: an 
application of the State action doctrine 
 
The application of the regulated conduct defence is more complex in multi-level governance settings 
as different legal principles collide. In such settings, there is usually a legal principle of hierarchy of norms 
whereby the norm adopted at the superior (e.g., federal) level prevails over the norm adopted at the inferior 
(e.g., state) level. According to this principle, federal competition law prevails over state regulation and, in 
such circumstances, the regulated conduct defence should not be accepted. 
However, according to, for example, the principles of state autonomy and of subsidiarity, courts in 
some jurisdictions allow regulation adopted at an inferior level to include an exemption from competition 
law adopted at a superior level. Moreover under the principles of legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations, courts have decided that undertakings abiding by regulation that is contrary to a superior 
competition law norm should not be sanctioned. In all those cases, the courts have allowed, in effect, a 
regulated conduct defence. Depending on the institutional context and the judicial history, the conditions of 
the defence may differ among jurisdictions.  
3.2.1 State Action doctrine in the U.S. 
In the U.S., the federal law prevails over state laws pursuant to the supremacy clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.53 Thus in principle, federal competition laws prevails over state regulations. However, the 
Supreme Court created an exception to the principle and accepted a state regulated conduct defence when 
the challenged conduct met two conditions:54
Clear authorisation  
 (i) the conduct should be clearly authorised and (ii) the 
conduct should be actively supervised by the state. The first condition serves to ensure that the state has 
affirmatively authorized departures from free-market competition. The second condition serves to ensure 
that state action immunity shelters only the particular anticompetitive acts of private parties that, in the 
judgment of the State, actually further state regulatory policies.  
First, the challenged conduct must be authorised by a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
state regulatory policy. The state should have contemplated the challenged conduct and decided to permit 
it, while the details of the regulatory scheme may be left to a state agency or government subdivision. The 
Supreme Court held that the condition was satisfied when the anti-competitive conduct was the 
                                                     
52  For a different interpretation of Trinko, see among others Shelanski (2011) who sees and regrets and new 
form of antitrust immunity in Trinko.. 
53 U.S. Const. Art. VI, §2. ICN (2005, p.66). On the ambiguous relationship between pre-emption and the 
state action doctrine, see Hovenkamp (2005, at §20.1). 
54 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 421 U.S. 773 (1975); California 
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminium, 445 U.S. 97 (1986). For an analysis of those conditions, 
see Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007, 366-377), Bush (2006), Delacourt J.T. and Zywicki TJ. 
(2005), Elhauge (1991). 
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“foreseeable result” of a state statute.55 Such standard led courts to allow regulated conduct to be shielded 
through “clear articulation” by either a general state authority or through a broad regulatory regime. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court merely requires that the conduct is authorised, and not imposed, by the 
state.56
Authorisation must come from the state itself in its executive, legislative and judicial branches (state’s 
Supreme Court), but not from a governmental subdivision such as a municipality or from a subordinated 
agency of the state. As put by Hovenkamp (2005 at §20.4), the courts have focused on three questions to 
determine what constitutes a state body: 
 
i) “Whether the agency or board at issue has quasi-legislative powers and is not merely instructed 
to carry certain functions; 
ii) Whether the decision makers in the agency, office or board are composed entirely of government 
officials with no financial interests in the regulated market and not from representatives of the 
regulated market; 
iii) Whether the agency is governed or answerable in some explicit fashion to the legislature, 
governor or state supreme court”. 
The FTC State Action Report (2003) notes that some lower courts have implemented the clear 
articulation standard too loosely in a manner not consistent with its underlying goal. To address this 
concern, that Report recommended57
Active supervision 
 that courts ask two questions in applying the clear articulation 
requirement: (1) whether the conduct at issue has been authorized by the state, and (2) whether the state 
has deliberately adopted a policy to displace competition in the manner at issue. Such requirements would 
focus the inquiry on the existence of deliberate and intended state policies to displace competition. 
Second, the challenged conduct must be actively supervised by the state itself. Thus, the state’s policy 
may permit private parties to act anti-competitively, but the state must ensure that private decision makers 
are acting in accordance with state policy and not carrying out additional anticompetitive acts that fall 
outside the state authorisation. According to Hovenkamp (2005 at §20.5), three issues should be 
distinguished: when is supervision required, what kind of supervision is required and who must supervise.  
i) The supervision is required when the challenged conduct is that of a private party with 
discretionary power, but not when the actor is governmental58 or a private party acting without 
discretion.59
ii) The supervising agency or the court should be empowered to supervise and it should carry out 
such supervision in practice. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, “The active supervision 
 
                                                     
55 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985) and Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. 
United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985). 
56 Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985). 
57 Such recommendation has also been made by the Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007, p.371 
recommendation 71). On the review of the US State action doctrine, see also Cooper and Kovacic (2010, p. 
1585) 
58 See Town of Hallie. 
59 See Municipal Utilities Board of Albertville v. Alabama Power Co, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1148 (1995). 
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requires that state officials have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of 
private parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy”60, and the “mere 
potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State”.61
iii) The supervision should be done by the same level of government that has imposed the regulation. 
If the regulation is from the state, then supervision should be carried out by the state agency in 
charge of enforcing the regulatory regime. If the regulation is municipal, then supervision should 
be carried out by the city council directly or by a commission or an agency.
 
Similarly, mere reporting or supervision which is limited to process is not sufficient. 
62
The Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007, p.373) recommends that courts use a flexible, 
“tiered” approach that requires a different level of active supervision depending on factors such as the type 
of conduct at issue (e.g. per se violation of competition law or not), the entity engaging in that conduct 
(whether the entity is more or less governmental), the industry, and the regulatory scheme. 
 
Thus when the conduct is not clearly authorised and actively supervised by the state, a regulated 
conduct defence is not allowed. However, when there is rate regulation at the federal or the state level, the 
Supreme Court allows competition law immunity limited to some sanctions under the “filed rate doctrine” 
explained above. 
3.2.2 State action doctrine in the EU 
In the EU, the TFEU prevails over all Member States rules.63 Therefore, EU competition law should 
normally prevail over national regulations. Although the competition provisions of the TFEU are addressed 
to private and public undertakings, the Court of Justice decided that, according to the loyalty clause of the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU),64 Member States may not adopt regulation that would deprive EU 
competition rules of their effectiveness,65 save the exceptions provided in the TFEU especially regarding 
the provision of services of general economic interest. On that basis, the Court of Justice has not allowed 
any industry to claim a complete exemption from EU competition law on the basis of a national 
regulation.66
The prohibited national measures fall into four categories: 
 
• encouraging or reinforcing unlawful agreements or practices; 
• giving companies power to regulate themselves;  
                                                     
60 Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988). 
61 FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co, 504 US 621, 638 (1992). 
62 Hovenkamp (2005 at §20.5c). 
63 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa contre E.N.E.L., [1964] ECR  1141. 
64 Art. 4(3) TEU. 
65 Combination of Articles 4(3) TEU with 101 and 102 TFEU for private undertakings and Article 106 TFEU 
for public undertakings. Case 267/86 Van Eycke v ASPA [1988] ECR 4769 at 16, Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed 
[1989] ECR 838 at 48. 
66 See Case 172/80, Züchner v. Bayerische Vereinsbank [1981] ECR 2021 (banking industry); Case 41/83, 
Italy v. Commission [1984] ECR 873 (telecommunications industry); Case 45/85, Verband der 
Sachversicherer v. Commission [1987] ECR 405 (insurance industry). 
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• requiring conduct incompatible with Articles 101-102 TFEU;  
• making violations of those Articles inevitable.67
Thus, Member States (legislative, executive, regulatory authorities) may not adopt regulation that 
would encourage or force undertakings to violate EU competition law. For instance, a regulatory authority 
may not approve or authorise any price fixing arrangements between companies which is contrary to 
Article 101 TFEU or any price which is so excessive that it is contrary to Article 102 TFEU. If a Member 
State would adopt such regulation, contrary to EU law, this regulation should be dis-applied by all Member 
State’s authorities, including a competition authority, a regulatory authority or a court.  
 
However, the Treaty provides that competition rules do not apply, hence national law may apply, 
when it is necessary for the provision of a service of general economic interest (SGEI).68 This provision is 
construed narrowly by the Court of Justice and requires three conditions to be met:69
i) Undertaking is ‘entrusted’ by the state, with legislation or a contract, to carry out a service as 
SGEI. Although Member States have large discretion to determine what a SGEI is, some EU 
criteria are emerging: the service should be universal, compulsory and provided for general, and 
not private, interest.
 
70 Examples include controlling navigation on an important waterway, a 
universal and continuous mooring service at ports, operating the public telephone network, 
broadcasting television, operating the national public electricity supply, the basic postal service, 
supplementary pension schemes, operating an unprofitable air route for reasons of the general 
interest, and management of environmentally undesirable waste.71
ii) The restriction of competition is necessary to ensure that the service can be provided under 
economically acceptable conditions; 
 
iii) The restriction of competition is not contrary to the interest of the Union. This provision has not 
yet received a detailed scrutiny by the Court of Justice, but it requires more than the proof that 
the state measures do not affect the trade between Member States. 
If a Member State does not fulfil its obligations under EU law and adopts a regulation compelling 
undertakings to adopt anti-competitive behaviours that cannot be justified for the provision of a SGEI, the 
Court of Justice may allow a regulated conduct defence. This will, however, only be the case in the 
situation where the regulated firm has no autonomy and if the national law has not yet been declared 
contrary to EU law by a national authority or by the European Commission. 
No autonomy for the firms 
                                                     
67 Moreover, national regulation may not violate the EU internal market rules. 
68 Article 106(2) TFEU. 
69 Chalmers et al. (2010, p.1030). See Case C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] ECR I-2523, Case C-203/96 
Dusseldorp [1998] ECR I-4075, Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz, [2001] 
ECR I-8089. 
70 See Case T-289/03 BUPA v Commission [2008] ECR II-81, paras 172 and European Commission (2001). 
71 See Temple Lang (2008, at section VIII). 
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The regulated conduct defence, which is construed restrictively,72 is only accepted when the 
regulation imposes the challenged conduct and removes any autonomy of the undertakings.73
i) Whether the regulation is subject to the final approval of a government authority, e.g. a Minister, 
possibly after consulting with other independent public bodies; 
 This implies 
that the regulation should have been adopted by public authorities and not by the regulated parties. 
According to Gerard (2011), the courts consider three main criteria: 
ii) Whether the regulation has been elaborated by a committee composed of a majority of members 
independent from the industry actors or associations. As noted by Temple Lang (2004), “the case 
law distinguishes between companies being represented on consultative bodies, which is legal as 
long as official powers are exercised by an official authority, and situations in which a dominant 
enterprise or a group of companies are themselves allowed to take the operative decisions or to 
exercise official regulatory powers, which is illegal.74
iii) Whether industry representatives must take into account statutory criteria aimed at ensuring the 
public interest. 
 It is lawful for prices to be proposed by 
committees including representatives of enterprises, provided that the legislation granting the 
power to propose prices requires the public interest to be taken into account (so that judicial 
review would be possible on this ground) and provided that the public authority has power to 
alter or override the committee’s proposal”; 
The courts will therefore carry out a test to verify that it is the Member State, acting through a 
government body that retains the final word in the decision making process administering the regulated 
conduct. The test is mainly formal and avoids any substantive assessment of the public policy 
considerations that the state may take into account.75
The regulated conduct defence is not permitted when the regulation merely encourages or authorises 
the undertakings to engage in autonomous anti-competitive conduct. The presence of a regulation may, 
however, constitute a mitigating factor when setting the sanction. The Commission Guidelines on setting 
 
                                                     
72 Case C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato 
[2003] ECR I-8055, at 67 and cases cited therein. At 68-69, the Court of Justice added that: “price 
competition does not constitute the only effective form of competition or that to which absolute priority 
must in all circumstances be given. Consequently, pre-determination of the sales price of matches by the 
Italian State does not, on its own, rule out all scope for competitive conduct. Even if limited, competition 
may operate through other factors”. 
73 Wainwright and Bouquet (2004). This is established case-law: Case C-359/95P Commission and France v. 
Ladbroke, ECR [1995] I-6265, para.33, very recently Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera ECR 
[2011] I-0000, para.49-50. 
74 See e.g., Case C-96/94 Centro Servizi Spediporto [1995] ECR I 2883; Case C-140/94 DIP v. Comune di 
Bassano [1995] ECR I 3257; Case C-70/95 Sodemare v. Regione Lombardia [1997] ECR I 3395 (social 
welfare health care services: a Member State may decide to allow only non-profit-making operators to 
provide social welfare, under contracts refunding their expenses to them); Case C-38/97, Librandi [1998] 
ECR I 5955; Case C-266/96, Corsica Ferries [1998] ECR I 3949; Case C-35/96, Commission v. Italy 
[1998] ECR I 3851 (legislation allowing a price set by a national committee of customs agents, to be 
charged by all customs agents, is illegal: the national legislation “wholly relinquished to private economic 
operators the powers of the public authorities as regards the setting of tariffs”; Case T-513/93, CNSD v. 
Commission, [2000] ECR II 1807. 
75 Chalmers at al. (2010, p.1019). Gerard (2011) observes that such formal analysis may be due to the lack of 
room in the EU competition law system of analysis for the consideration of public interest justifications. 
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fines76 state that there is a mitigating factor “where the anti-competitive conduct of the undertaking has 
been authorized or encouraged by public authorities or by legislation”. This view has been endorsed by the 
Court of Justice in several cases.77
The validity of the national regulation  
 This is also the case in some Member States, for example Portugal (See 
Box 7) 
When the national regulation cannot be justified for the provision of a SGEI under EU law, the 
regulated conduct defence may only be relied upon until a definitive decision has declared the Member 
State’s regulation contrary to EU law,78 but not after the decision has been rendered.79
3.2.3 State action doctrine in Canada 
 
In Canada, the federal Competition Act in principle prevails over provincial regulation pursuant to the 
federal paramountcy rule and the application of general law in accordance with its plain reading. However, 
the Supreme Court created an exception to this principle and has accepted the regulated conduct defence 
when there is a clear operational conflict between the provincial regulation and the Competition Act, such 
that obedience to the regulation regime means contravention of the Competition Act. It is the specific 
conduct rather than the industry as a whole that is examined. The Competition Bureau indicates that it will 
strive to determine Parliament’s intention with respect to the application of the relevant Competition Act 
provision(s) to the impugned conduct, but that it will not refrain from pursuing regulated conduct under the 
reviewable matters provision(s) simply because the provincial law may be interpreted as authorizing the 
conduct or is more specific than the Act. The Bureau also observes that greater scrutiny of the activities of 
regulatees, whether acting in their private capacity or as self-regulators, may be warranted.80
3.2.4 State action doctrine in Australia 
 
In Australia, the mechanism to provide exemptions from the competition law was significantly 
tightened with the National Competition Policy Reform of the mid-1990s. Instead of being shielded by a 
general state action doctrine, exemptions have now to be explicit. A law could not operate to exempt 
conduct from competition law unless the exempting law specifically stated that the conduct was exempted 
and the federal government retained a right to veto state or territory exemptions. Such exemptions are 
published on the website of the antitrust authority.81
3.3 Core principles 
 
To conclude, in most jurisdictions, the regulated conduct defence is based on the following main 
related legal principles and judicial policies82
                                                     
76 European Commission (2006, at 29). This is also the case in some Member States. For instance 
Bundeskartellamt (2006), para.17. 
: 
77 Fiammiferi, at 57, Deutsche Telekom, at 279.  
78 Fiammiferi, at 53-54. 
79 Fiammiferi, at 55. 
80 Competition Bureau of Canada (2010, p.5-6). 
81 See : http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/688173. 
82 ICN (2004b, p.20). 
DAF/COMP(2011)3 
 38 
• The defence aims to respect the intent of the legislator and the bona fide exercise by the State of its 
sovereign regulatory powers. In the particular context of multi-level governance, the defence may 
be justified by the principle of federalism and the principle of subsidiarity.  
• Conversely, the defence is also based on the principle that it should not be up to politically 
unaccountable private actors to determine when marketplace outcomes are unacceptable or not. 
More generally as Odudu (2006, p.46) observes, “differential treatment of public authorities and 
private (corporate) citizens can be justified to reflect the differing roles played by citizens and the 
state in a constitutional democracy,” as “public power is exercised in the public interest, and the 
public interest is determined through democratic representation”. 
• The defence also applies the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations by ensuring 
that firms do not face inconsistent legal demands from regulations and competition law. 
• When regulation pursues the same goals than competition policy, the defence may also be justified 
by a cost-benefit analysis indicating that there is little added-value of applying competition law in 
addition to regulation. 
In general, courts accepted the regulated conduct defence only restrictively and only to the extent that 
the exemption to antitrust is necessary to achieve the goals of regulation as all legal doctrines on which the 
defence is based (express immunity, implied immunity and state action doctrine) are strictly construed.83
Beyond those core principles, the jurisprudence is complex as it has developed pragmatically on a 
case-by-case basis and lacks clarity in marginal cases.
 
As observed by the ICN (2004b, p. 6), “as a general interpretative rule, exceptions to competition laws are 
not easily inferred by the courts, who need to be conveniently satisfied that the regulator validly intended 
to grant competition law immunity to some conducts. Thus, in the majority of cases, permission of a given 
behaviour under a specific regulatory regime cannot entail per se that the requirements of competition laws 
need not be complied with by the regulated subjects”. 
84 The degree of supervision that the state should 
provide where there is an exemption from competition law is one such example. Moreover, sometimes the 
regulated conduct defence has been accepted too easily by lower Courts as its conditions of application 
have not been sufficiently strictly respected.85
The conditions for a regulated conduct defence may vary across jurisdictions. For instance, the EU 
has more power to limit the Member States’ anti-competitive regulation than the U.S. federal institutions 
 
                                                     
83 In some jurisdictions in the past, courts have applied the exemptions too broadly and the legislator 
intervened to narrow the interpretation. An example is provided by South Africa where the 1998 
Competition Act excluded ‘acts subject to or authorised by other legislation.’ Courts began to interpret this 
phrase so that firms in regulated sectors escaped Competition Act oversight whether or not the other 
regulatory process also controlled anticompetitive conduct so that bank mergers were exempted, 
agricultural co-operatives were exempted. The legislation was amended to avoid the problem in the future: 
OECD (2003, p. 51). 
84 ICN (2004b, p.19) ; Temple Lang (2004). 
85 As observed by the Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007, p.344), “Critics warn, however, that the 
lower courts increasingly have applied the Midcal test in ways that allow defendants to obtain antitrust 
immunity in situations where a state did not intend to displace competition. Others question whether courts 
have properly taken into account the potential for one state’s endorsement of anticompetitive conduct to 
have spillover effects that raise prices or otherwise harm consumers in other states. And there is also a 
serious question whether the state action doctrine should immunize conduct by state government entities 
and municipalities when they act as market participants”. 
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despite the much higher degree of U.S. federal integration. In the EU, Member States have a duty to act in 
accordance with EU competition policy and organs of state should ‘disapply’ national legislation 
contravening EU law. In the U.S., the Supreme Court observes that the State action doctrine does not aim 
“to determine whether the State has met some normative standard”, but rather to consider “whether the 
State has exercised sufficient independent judgement and control so that the details of the rates or prices 
have been established as a product of deliberate state intervention, not simply by agreement among private 
parties.”86
Box 3. Telecommunications cases in the EU and in the U.S.:  Deutsche Telekom and Trinko 
 Moreover, the case-law differs in some cases due the difference in institutional framework as 
explained in Box 3. 
In the EU, the European Commission87 imposed a fine of €12.6 million, on the basis of Article 102 TFEU, on the 
German telecommunications operator Deutsche Telekom for an anti-competitive price squeeze between its wholesale 
fixed network access charges and its retail end-users tariffs for access lines. At the same time, the German regulatory 
authority was regulating the wholesale charges on a cost-basis and imposing a price cap on a basket of retail services 
which included access lines and calls. The Commission condemned Deutsche Telekom because although it has no 
autonomy as regards wholesale charges, it has some room for autonomous actions with respect to retail tariffs. 
Deutsche Telekom could have eliminated or reduced the squeeze by decreasing the tariffs of its access lines (and by 
increasing the tariffs of its calls). The Commission decision and reasoning were upheld in appeal first by the General 
Court88 and then by the Court of Justice.89




 refused to condemn, on the basis of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, the telecommunications operator Verizon for not having given competitors access to its network. This 
was a private enforcement case launched by a customer of Verizon’s competitors, Mr. Trinko. At the same time, the 
FCC and the New York state regulators had condemned Verizon for having violated its access obligation under the 
1996 Telecommunications Act. The New York state regulator issued orders requiring Verizon to pay $10 million to its 
injured competitors, and pursuant to FCC consent decree, Verizon agreed to pay $3 million to the U.S. Treasury. The 
Court held that the regulatory duties to deal established under the 1996 Telecommunications Act did not create a new 
cause of action under the refusal-to-deal doctrine of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
91
The differences between the EU and U.S. solutions may also be explained by their different institutional settings. 
EU competition law has a constitutional value (as enshrined in the TFEU) whose application can not be removed by 
 note that the position of the U.S. Supreme Court may partly be explained by the specificities of 
the U.S. legal system as well as the peculiarities of the case at hand: first, the U.S. telecommunications regulation was 
very pervasive at the time; second the U.S. competition law provides for high private damages in cases of violation of 
competition law (possibility of class actions and treble damages) which increase the costs of competition law 
enforcement errors, and is administrated by judicial Courts which are not able to monitor behavioural remedies; third, 
Mr. Trinko was a customer of a new entrant that claimed to have suffered loss because his operator had faced refusal 
to deal from the incumbent (thus Mr. Trinko was more interested by the prospect of earning large financial 
compensation than by the protection of the competitive structure.) 
                                                     
86 FTC v. Ticor Tile Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 635 (1992). Note however that, as it is the case in the EU, U.S. 
state laws can not discriminate against interstate commerce according to the U.S. Constitution. See for 
instance: City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways 
Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
87 Commission Decision of 21 May 2003, Case 37.451 Deutsche Telekom, OJ [2003] L 263/9. See also a 
similar case: Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case 38.784 Wanadoo España v Telefónica, OJ [2008] 
C 83/6. 
88 Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v. European Commission, [2008] ECR II-477. 
89 Case C-280/08P, Deutsche Telekom v. European Commission, [2010] ECR I-0000. 
90 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 682 (2004). 
91 Geradin (2004, p.1548), Larouche (2006, p.7-8). 
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national sector-specific regulation whereas American competition law has the same legal value as federal sector-
specific regulation. Moreover, the Commission is an administrative authority that has the same ability to analyse a case 
as a regulatory authority. Also, the Commission may want to use competition law cases to ensure that national 
regulator abide by EU competition rules. 
4.  The regulated conduct defence in merger cases 
4.1 Competition law and regulatory merger review standards 
On the substantive side, merger review may be based on different substantive standards across 
jurisdictions and across sectors. The review may be based on a competition law standard related to 
efficiency (the merger should be prohibited if it significantly lessens competition but otherwise is should 
be allowed). Or the merger review may also be based on a broader regulatory “public interest” standard 
(the merger should be prohibited if it goes against the public interest but otherwise should be permitted). 
The public interest standard, which may vary by industry, may include efficiency considerations but may 
also include other types of considerations. On the institutional side, the merger review may be done by the 
competition authority and/or by a regulatory authority. 
For instance in the U.S., a public interest standard enforced by regulatory authorities apply in four 
industries: certain aspects of electricity (regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); 
telecommunications/media (regulated by the Federal Communications Commission which take into 
account possible effects on the diversity of views available and the obligation to provide universal service, 
as well as likely effects on competition); banking (regulated by various banking agencies); and railroads 
(regulated by the Surface Transportation Board which take into account such factors as public benefits, 
labour conditions, environmental issues, and effects on competition.)92
When the sector or a firm is subject to regulation, two issues arise in relation to a competition law 
merger review.  
 In Canada, the responsibility of the 
approval of bank mergers resides with the Ministry of Finance while the Competition Bureau and the 
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions play an important role in the analysis. Also for the 
approval of major airline mergers, responsibility resides with the Governor in Council. 
• The first issue is whether the regulation leads the sector or the firm to be exempted from the 
application of the competition law merger review. This issue should be dealt with according to the 
principles analysed above and the courts only allow exemptions restrictively. 
• The second issue is what will be the impact of regulation in competition law merger analysis based 
on an efficiency standard.93
4.2 The regulated conduct (ex-ante) defence in a competition law merger review 
 More particularly, the issue is whether the regulation may be relied 
upon and used as an ex-ante defence to facilitate the approval of the merger.  
In the jurisdictions and sectors where a competition law merger review standard is applicable, the 
authority (whether the competition authority or the regulatory authority) may decide to take regulation into 
account when regulation pursues the same goals as competition law and controls the possible anti-
                                                     
92 Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007, p. 363). 
93 The paper does not deal with the relationships between antitrust merger review based on an efficiency 




competitive behaviours resulting from the merger. This is particularly the cases in recently liberalised 
sectors where regulation supports competition law in steering the market towards effective competition. In 
such cases, the merging parties may invoke a sort of ex-ante regulated conduct defence to facilitate the 
approval of the merger. 
For instance in the EU, the European Commission does not impose competition law remedies in order 
to approve telecommunications concentrations if the sector regulation is deemed to be sufficient to prevent 
anti-competitive behaviour or anti-competitive effects as a result of a merger (see Box 4). Similarly in 
Canada, the Competition Bureau has taken sectoral regulation into account to allow mergers in the 
electricity sector.94
Box 4. Regulation serving as a competition law merger defence: Telecommunications in the EU 
 In the U.S., the Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007, p.364) recommends that 
competition law enforcement agencies take into account the effects of regulation in their merger 
assessment. 
In the EU, the European Commission does not impose additional competition law remedies to approve a 
concentration if EU or even foreign95
• In Deutsche Telekom/OTE, the European Commission approved a merger strengthening the power of the 
Romanian incumbent by taking into account the regulation imposed by the Romanian regulator on 
RomTelecom, a subsidiary of OTE.
 regulation is sufficient to prevent anti-competitive behaviour. 
96
• Similarly in Vodafone/Tele2 Italy/Tele2 Spain, the European Commission approved a 4 to 3 merger by 




• In T-Mobile/Orange Netherlands, one of the reasons why the European Commission approved the merger 
was the fact the mobile termination rates of the merging parties were regulated by the Dutch 
telecommunications regulator, thereby limiting the merged entity’s ability to foreclose rivals.
 
98
With the strengthening of EU sector-specific regulation, its alignment to competition law principles and the 
adoption of the Roaming Regulation,
 
99
Conversely, the European Commission imposed merger remedies where sector-specific regulation was deemed 
 the tendency to take into account regulation in the assessment of 
concentrations has increased significantly. It led to many mergers being cleared without any competition law remedies 
being imposed, particularly in respect of vertical foreclosure concerns, where effective regulation is one factor 
preventing the implementation of foreclosure strategies by the merging parties. 
                                                     
94 ICN (2004c, p.6). 
95 Commission Decision of 7 October 2005, Case M.3752, Verizon/MCI,. 
96 Commission Decision of 2 October 2008, Case M.5148, Deutsche Telekom/OTE, paras.26, 89 and 115. 
97 Commission Decision of 27 November 2007, Case M.4947, Vodafone/Tele2 Italy/Tele2 Spain, paras.22–
27. 
98 Commission Decision of 20 August 2007, Case M. 4748 T-Mobile/Orange Netherlands, para.49, where the 
Commission took into account in its competition assessment the fact that the Dutch regulator found that no 
undertaking possessed SMP on the wholesale mobile market for access and call origination. 
99 Regulation 717/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 27, 2007 on roaming on public 
mobile telephone networks within the Community and amending Directive 2002/21, O.J. 2007 L171/32, as 
amended by Regulation 544/2009, O.J. 2009 L167/12. 
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to be inadequate. 
• In 1999, in Telia/Telenor, the Commission found that the sector-specific regulatory regimes in place in 
Sweden and Norway at the time were inadequate to prevent anti-competitive conduct by the merged entity, 
which justified the imposition of remedies of a regulatory nature (i.e. local loop unbundling).100
• Later, in Telia/Sonera, the Commission appeared to take the view that both the ex post nature of regulation 
in Finland and Sweden and the EU’s sector-specific regulatory regime (which required accounting 
separation, but not structural separation of undertakings with SMP and local loop unbundling) were (despite 
strengthening in the meantime) still inadequate to prevent anti-competitive conduct that could have arisen 
due to the vertical effects of the merger. The Commission therefore imposed conditions requiring the legal 
separation of the different fixed and mobile network and service businesses of the parties in Sweden and 






Source: Garzaniti and O’Regan (2010 at 8-025 and 8-026) 
 the Commission imposed substantial access and behavioural remedies (even 
though the Italian media regulator had jurisdiction to apply sector-specific regulation), and relied on the Italian regulator 
to monitor their implementation. 
5.  Institutional settings to alleviate or reduce conflict between regulation and competition law 
and policy103
The legal conditions for the regulated conduct defence do not always correspond to the economic 
criteria for effective and efficient regulation. This may lead to the application of regulation that unduly 
restricts competition. It is therefore important that institutional mechanisms are in place to alleviate or 
reduce unjustified conflict between competition and regulation. Such mechanisms may play a role in the 
design and in the enforcement of regulation. 
 
5.1 Institutional settings to alleviate or reduce conflict in the design of regulation and competition 
law 
One of the main means to alleviate regulations which unduly restrict competition is to perform a 
competition assessment on the proposed and the existing regulations.104
                                                     
100 Commission Decision of 13 October 1999, Case M.1439, Telia/Telenor . 
 Such competition assessment is 
particularly important if the regulation provides for an explicit competition law exemption. However, for 
efficiency reasons, a detailed and comprehensive competition assessment should only be undertaken when 
the initial estimate suggests that the potential costs of the anti-competitive effects of the regulation are 
significant enough to justify the necessary expenditure of resources that an in-depth competition 
assessment requires. 
101 Commission Decision of 10 July 2002, Case M.2803, Telia/Sonera . 
102 Commission Decision of 2 April 2003, Case M.2876, Newscorp/Telepiu, , para.259. 
103 Also Sokol (2009). 
104 As recommended by the Council of the OECD: see Recommendation of the Council of the OECD of 22 
October 2009 on Competition Assessment. 
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The OECD Competition Assessment Toolkit105 provides a general methodology for identifying 
unnecessary competitive restraints and developing alternative, less restrictive policies that still achieve 
government objectives. It includes the following four steps:106
• Identify policy objectives, 
 
• State alternative regulations which would achieve the same policy objectives, 
• Evaluate the competitive effects of each alternative policy option, with the help of a competition 
checklist, 
• Compare the alternatives. 
If the assessment identifies significant potential for a weakening of competition within the affected 
industry or related industries, policymakers should seek, according to the proportionality principle, the 
least anti-competitive alternative that would achieve the same policy goal. Moreover, the benefits and costs 
of such a regulatory approach should be weighed against each other. Anti-competitive regulation is only 
justified if its benefits exceed its costs. 
Such competition assessment should be integrated at an early stage in the policy making process107 
and competition authorities should be associated as much as possible. In particular before putting in place 
explicit competition law immunity through a legislative measure, the U.S. Antitrust Modernization 
Commission recommends to consult the federal antitrust agencies.108
In the EU, the European Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines require an ex-ante analysis of 
the impact on effective competition of all major EU initiatives.
 
109 In the United States, Regulatory Impact 
Analysis (RIA) guidance documents require consideration of market impacts.110
Box 5. Australian National Competition Policy Reforms 
 In Australia, a very 
comprehensive competitive assessment of federal and state regulations was undertaken in the mid-nineties 
(see Box 5). Today, the ACCC requires that all RIA documents state whether the proposed regulation 
complies with the terms of the National Competition Policy agreements, and include analysis to support 
this conclusion. 
After the completion of the Hilmer Committee’s report in 1993 which urged greater microeconomic openness with 
a focus on pro-competitive reforms, all nine governments agreed in 1995 to undertake a systematic review of 
legislation that had anti-competitive effects, even if it was not directly inconsistent with the competition law. This 
included laws that set up entry barriers, such as licensing regimes, or that controlled conduct by setting or controlling 
qualifications, opening hours, prices, technical specifications, and marketing arrangement. Some 1700 separate 
enactments, mostly at the state level, were identified as requiring a review. Most reviews were completed in 2001. The 
standard of review was that the restriction on competition should be necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
regulation, and the benefits of the restriction should outweigh the costs. New legislation requires a regulation impact 
                                                     
105  See OECD (2011a and 2011b). Also Baldwin and Cave (1999, Chapter 7), Cooper and Kovacic (2010, p. 
1607). 
106  OECD (2011a, p.35). 
107  Also ICN (2002, p.60). 
108  Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007, p.353: recommendation 59). 
109  European Commission (2009, p. 33 and 40-41). In the EU Member States, see OFT (2007). 
110  See Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, 17 September 2003. 
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analysis that incorporates the same standard. The federal government offered funding to aid state and territorial 
governments with any adjustment costs that might arise from revisions of legislation. 
Other means ensuring the reduction of unjustified conflicts between regulation and competition rules 
are: to provide the regulation with a sunset clause forcing the legislator to revisit after a certain period the 
need for a regulation which may have anti-competitive effects111
5.2 Institutional settings to alleviate or reduce conflict in the enforcement of regulation and 
competition law 
; or to base regulation on competition 
principles as it as been done for instance with the EU regulatory framework for telecommunications (see 
Box 1).  
Even if regulation and competition law pursues similar objectives, a conflict may still arise in the 
enforcement of both types of rules. This is especially the case when different authorities are involved. To 
alleviate those risks, several mechanisms are possible. These mechanisms should be adapted to the national 
circumstances and flexible enough respond to, develop, and change in accordance with, new economic 
circumstances.112
5.2.1 Delimitation of jurisdiction between authorities in charge of enforcement of competition law and 
regulation 
 
Single authority in charge of competition law and regulation 
The most radical means to alleviate conflict between the implementation of competition law and 
regulation is to ensure that the same authority is in charge of both legal instruments. In Australia, New 
Zealand or the Netherlands, the competition authority applies the regulation affecting certain network 
industries.  
Conflicts may, however, still arise even if the same authority is responsible for both competition and 
regulatory enforcement. There is a risk of conflict that may arise between the objective to protect 
competition and other objectives pursued by the regulator (for example financial market stability). 
Regulatory objectives may in some cases take precedence over those pursued by competition rules.113
Different authorities in charge of competition law and regulation 
 
Internal co-operation and hierarchical oversight are thus required to ensure close integration of competition 
and regulatory objectives. 
A common institutional set-up in many jurisdictions is based on a functional separation of the 
regulatory and competition law enforcement activities. Enforcement of competition law is therefore 
overseen by the competition authority while the regulation of prices and access is assigned to an often 
sector specific regulator.114
                                                     
111 Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007, p.353 recommendation 60). 
 
112 ICN (2004c, p.4), ICN (2005, p.10). For examples of institutional settings to reduce conflict in the 
telecommunications sector, see OECD (2006). 
113 ICN (2004a, p.4), Temple Lang (2008, at section VI). 
114 ICN (2004a, p. 4). 
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The main advantage of this functional approach is transparency and specialised expertise of each 
body.115 There are, however, also a number of risks including: inter-agency conflict, inefficient use of 
resources and increased costs, additional requirements and complexities due to multiple and divergent 
standards of review, potential delay in closing the transaction in merger cases, potential lack of 
transparency, risk of inconsistent results when complying with the requirements of both authorities, risk of 
regulatory gaming by market participants.116
When there is a specific regulatory authority, it may have concurrent power to apply competition 
rules. In those circumstances, one means to alleviate conflict is through the conclusion of cooperation 
agreements between authorities which set out the respective roles of each. (See the example of the UK in 
Box 6). 
 Thus a sound allocation of tasks between authorities and 
cooperation is necessary. 
When there is no concurrency power, an allocation of roles may be decided by the laws, courts or by 
agreements or practices between agencies. For instance, in Mexico, the law provides that the competition 
authority is responsible for some aspects of regulation: the determination of market power that is needed 
prior to regulation of a firm’s product or services. In the U.S., courts have decided, under the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine, that the competition authority should remain the appropriate body until the regulatory 
authority decides when the regulatory decision has a bearing on the competition law dispute.117 In the EU, 
the Commission has transferred several telecommunications competition law cases to the national 
regulatory authorities when they could be dealt with by such national authorities equally efficiently.118
Box 6. The division of work in case of concurrency power:  The UK case 
 
Under the 1998 UK Competition Act119, the OFT and sector regulators have concurrent power to pursue cases of 
alleged anti-competitive behaviour.  The Competition Act (Concurrency) Regulations 2004 sets out which regulator is 
to undertake the relevant functions.  In 2004 the OFT also released guidelines entitled “Concurrent application to 
regulated industries” which state that the purpose of the concurrency regulations is to ensure “the coordination of the 
performance of concurrent functions under the Act by the OFT and the Regulators”.120
The power of sector regulators to apply competition law has recently been considered in the Cityhook case
 
121
                                                     
115  On those advantages, see also Laffont and Tirole (2000) 
.  
Cityhook claimed that the OFT had acted unlawfully in failing to consider whether the case should be transferred to the 
telecoms regulator Ofcom (at the time Oftel) under the concurrency provisions. At the start of the case the OFT and 
Ofcom had formally agreed that the OFT would take on the case. The OFT then decided, due to administrative 
priorities, to close the case.  One of the reasons given by the OFT was Ofcom’s concurrent jurisdiction in the matter.  
However, at no point did the OFT engage in a dialogue with Ofcom which would have allowed the regulator the 
opportunity to take over the case.  The court held that as a result the OFT had not respected the concurrency 
regulations. Proper consideration should have been given to the possible transfer of the case to Ofcom, who should be 
116  ICN (2005, p.9). Note that Barros and Hoernig (2004) show that it may be more efficient that both 
authorities decide a case independently than jointly for three reasons. First, with independent decisions, the 
probability that cases are solved is highest, even though each authority may give less attention to the case 
than it was alone. Second, independent decisions are less vulnerable to lobbying. Third, it is also less likely 
that no authority feels responsible for a given case. 
117  Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973). See Hovenkamp (2005 at §19.4). 
118  Geradin and Sidak (2005, p.539), Garzaniti and O’Regan (Chapter V). 
119  See section 54. 
120  See OFT (2004, p.30). 
121  Cityhook Ltd, Cityhook (Cornwall) Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2009] EWHC 57 (Admin).  
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able to decide for itself (based on its own available resources and administrative priorities) whether to take on the 
case.  
The National Audit Office (NOA) 2010 Review of the UK’s Competition Landscape122
5.2.2 Cooperation between competition and regulatory authorities 
 also discusses in some 
detail the role of regulators in applying competition law. One of the findings of the review was that “to date Regulators 
have used their competition enforcement powers sparingly, with the risk that the case law is not as rich as it needs to 
be.” Regulators tend to prefer using their regulatory powers and the review provided three main disincentives against 
the use of competition powers; (i) the duration of Competition Act cases, (ii) the difficulty of proving an infringement 
and the resource commitment and (iii) the impact on a regulators own limited resources when compared to using 
regulatory powers. 
When different authorities are in charge of the enforcement of competition law and regulation, they 
may conclude formal cooperation agreements to alleviate or reduce conflict between their activities. Such 
cooperation is particularly necessary in some jurisdictions such as the EU where regulatory authorities can 
not violate EU competition rules and where the principle of proportionality requires the avoidance of 
multiple procedures on similar facts. Cooperation agreements may provide for the following:123
• A right for the competition authority to make submissions or provide industry regulators with 
comments or experts reports, participate in regulatory hearings, and ask for optional referrals. For 
instance, under the EU telecommunication regulation, a national regulator performing a regulatory 
market analysis should associate the national competition authority and then submit its draft 
decision to the Commission (including the Directorate-General for Competition) for possible veto 
for violation of EU law (including competition rules).
 
124
• Allowing for joint proceedings in certain instances in order to make use of complementary 
expertise; 
 In the U.S., the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice participates in proceedings, submits comments to, appears before, or 
consults on competition-related issues with many federal agencies. Also Section 271 of the U.S. 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires the FCC to consult with the DOJ regarding entry in the 
long distance telephony market and to accord “substantial weight” to the DOJ’s evaluation. In 
Canada, the Competition Bureau has authority under sections 125 and 126 of the Competition Act, 
to make representations in federal and provincial regulatory proceedings in respect to competition 
and those representations are given serious consideration by the regulatory authorities. 
• Mandatory agreements, consultations and referrals by the competition authority to the regulator, or 
notification of investigations that are within the jurisdiction of the other agency as in Portugal (see 
Box 7), and mandatory consultation or referrals as is the case for example in Germany; 
Both authorities may also rely on more informal and soft techniques of co-operation in the following 
manner, which is important to develop a shared culture:125
                                                     
122 Available at 
 
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0910/competition_landscape.aspx 
123 ICN (2004c, p.8) and ICN (2005) which contains specific examples in some jurisdictions, OECD (2005b). 
124 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ [2002] L 108/33, as 
amended by Directive 2009/140, Art. 7, 7a and 16(1). 
125  ICN (2004d, p.6) and ICN (2005, p.11) which contains specific examples of some jurisdictions. 
 DAF/COMP(2011)3 
 47 
• Formal and informal contacts, and exchange of views, appointment of contact persons within each 
agency, appointment of industry experts, regular or ad-hoc meetings to consider pending matters, 
and the creation of joint working groups or inter-agency task forces. Such contacts usually require 
the exchange of information that may need to be prescribed by law if the information is 
confidential.  
• Training and exchange of staff and officials on a regular basis, such as providing educational co-
operation and vocational training by the other authority, allowing staff at each agency to work at 
the other, and encouraging staff secondment or exchange of officials between agencies. For 
instance, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has associate 
commissioners in addition to the five permanent commissioners. Associate commissioners can 
include appointees from Commonwealth and State regulatory agencies. 
Box 7. Consultation between Sector Regulator and Competition Authority in Portugal 
In 2008 the Portuguese Competition Authority found that PT Comunicações (PTC) abused its dominant position 
in the wholesale market for circuit leasing. Wholesale clients lease circuits for interconnection between fixed and 
mobile networks and the sector is subject to regulation by ICP-ANACOM, the National Communications Authority.  
PTC was applying discriminatory conditions for equivalent services, to the benefit of enterprises in its own group and to 
the detriment of competitors.  PTC had proposed its scale of charges to ICP and the regulator decided not to oppose 
them coming into effect.   
In Portugal, competition law and sector regulation are applied in complementary legal frameworks, with the ICP 
review taking place ex-ante and competition law coming into play ex-post.  Intervention (or lack of it) from a sector 
regulator does not prevent the possibility of the competition authority taking action.  Companies are therefore obliged 
to ensure that their behaviour confirms to both legal frameworks.   
Whenever the competition authority carries out an ex –post analysis in the electronic communications sector, it is 
obliged to consult with ICP. In this case ICP was consulted both at the instigation of the case, and before the decision 
was adopted by the competition authority.  The final decision took into account the opinion issued by ICP on the case.   
In setting the fine for PTC the competition authority took as mitigating circumstances the decision of ICP not to 
oppose the scale of charges when they initially came into effect, and the fact that PTC ceased to apply them after the 
sector regulators later decision on the issue. 
 
Box 8. The interaction between payments systems interchange fee regulation and competition law in Australia 
The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) has powers to regulate payments systems where it considers it to be in the 
public interest. In this context the public interest is defined to include financial safety of the payments system, efficiency 
and competitiveness (Payments Systems (Regulation) Act (1998)). The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission concurrently has general powers to enforce the competition law’s price fixing provisions and to grant 
applications for exemptions from the price fixing prohibitions (known as “authorisation”) where there is net public 
benefit. There is a Memorandum of Understanding between the two agencies to facilitate efficient processes and 
outcomes. 
When using its powers, the RBA’s policy is to encourage participants to voluntarily reform their payments 
systems and, failing a voluntary solution, the RBA would generally regulate. The RBA’s power to regulate includes, 
amongst other things, the power to make standards setting or controlling interchange fees paid between institutions for 
processing payments within a payments system.  Indeed, under this regulatory framework there have been voluntary 
interchange fee reforms and also the RBA has imposed regulations on a number of occasions. 
In one case of attempted voluntary reform, the participants in the Electronic Funds Transfer Point of Sale system 
(EFTPOS), agreed to adopt a zero interchange fee in response to firm moral suasion by the RBA of a reasonably 
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specific nature. Because the proposal for a zero interchange fee was by agreement between the participants, the 
conventional wisdom was that the agreement would risk breaching the prohibition against price fixing unless the 
participants sought and were granted ACCC authorisation.  The ACCC did indeed grant authorisation but merchant 
customers of the system successfully appealed to the Australian Competition Tribunal Re EFTPOS Interchange Fees 
Agreement [2004] ACompT 7 (25 May 2004) who quashed the grant of authorisation and the voluntary reform 
therefore failed.  This ultimately resulted in further reform work and a mixed voluntary and regulated outcome. 
In another case where voluntary reform failed to satisfy the RBA’s reform priorities for the Australian part of the 
Visa and MasterCard systems, the RBA used its powers to regulate the interchange fees The Setting of Wholesale 
(‘Interchange’) Fees in the Designated Credit Card Schemes (2005).  In this case, the question then arose, as to 
whether participants in such payments systems who followed the RBA’s requirements might be in contravention of 
Australia’s price fixing prohibitions These are now contained in the Competition and Consumer Act (2010) and 
previously known as the Trade Practices Act (1974). There are a number of possible theories: perhaps there is no 
breach of the competition prohibitions because the RBA regulations remove the freedom of agreement between the 
parties and therefore there is no real “agreement” to set prices; perhaps there is an agreement but the agreement did 
not have the purpose or effect of fixing prices because the regulation not the agreement had that purpose and effect; 
or perhaps the enactment of the RBA’s powers constitute a limited implied repeal by Parliament of the general 
competition law prohibition.  On the other hand, perhaps the competition law prohibition would be contravened. 
ACCC litigation was at least a theoretical possibility and private sector litigation was reasonably likely. Rather 
than leave the answers to these questions uncertain, an exemption from the competition law prohibitions were put in 
place, initially temporarily by regulation and subsequently by legislation. After the temporary regulation was replaced 
the permanent legislation is contained within section 18A of the Payments Systems (Regulation) Act (1998) and this 
operates in conjunction with section 51(1)(a) of the Competition and Consumer Act (2010). 
5.2.3 Consistent interpretation of regulation and competition law via judicial appeal 
Another important means to alleviate conflict between the implementation of competition law and 
regulation is to ensure that both sets of rules are interpreted consistently. This may be achieved through the 
following techniques: 
• Ensuring a common appeal framework against the decisions of the competition law and regulatory 
authorities.126
• Ensuring that the competition authority or the regulatory authority can be heard by judges as 
amicus curiae. 
 This is the case in Belgium, France and the UK where the appeal against the 
decisions of the competition authorities and of some network industry regulators are heard before 
the same appeals court. 
• Ensuring that competition authorities adopt interpretative guidelines clarifying in advance the 
application of competition law to the regulated sectors. Such guidelines are useful for firms but 
also for judges. For instance in the EU, the European Commission adopted guidelines on the 
application of competition policy in the telecommunications or postal sectors.127 This was also the 
case in Japan in the electricity, gas and telecommunications sectors.128
                                                     
126  ICN (2004d, p.8). 
 
127 European Commission (1998a) and (1998b). Temple Lang (2008, at section I). 
128 ICN (2005, p.61). 
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5.3 The importance of advocacy by competition authorities 
As defined by the ICN Advocacy Report129
The effectiveness of such competition advocacy is affected by three main factors: the timing of the 
consultation, the compulsory or non-compulsory status of the consultation and the degree to which the 
recommendations made are binding.
, “Competition advocacy refers to those activities 
conducted by the competition authority related to the promotion of a competitive environment for 
economic activities by means of non-enforcement mechanisms, mainly through its relationships with other 
governmental entities and by increasing public awareness of the benefits of competition”. Thus advocacy 
refers to practically all the activities of a competition authority that do not fall under the enforcement 
activities. 
130
In the context of a regulated conduct defence, advocacy implies convincing other public authorities to 
abstain from either designing or enforcing a regulation in an unduly anticompetitive way. As explained 
above, this implies (i) encouraging and participating in competition impact assessment, (ii) cooperating 
with regulatory agencies to ensure that they fulfil their mandates by respecting competition policy 
objectives, and (iii) co-operating with judicial bodies to ensure they interpret regulatory provisions in a 
way consistent with competition policy. 
 
In the specific context of deregulation, ICN (2002, p. 70) observes that advocacy has been carried out 
in three main ways:  
• Elaboration of sector specific studies that consider market structures, emphasizing the benefits of 
allowing access and of introducing competition, 
• Implementation of cooperation agreements between the sector regulatory agencies and the 
competition authorities, especially useful to detect restrictive anticompetitive practices on 
competition by the regulated agents,  
• Drafting of guidelines and sector codes of conduct or compliance with the competition law.131
The practice shows that such advocacy has been particularly useful in the sectors of 
telecommunications, electricity, transport, and financial services. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The “regulated conduct defence” shields companies who carry out potentially anticompetitive 
behaviour from enforcement action when the behaviour is required under federal or state regulation. 
A number of key points emerge from this paper: 
• The regulated conduct defence is grounded in several legal principles (state sovereignty, 
federalism, subsidiarity, legal certainty and legitimate expectations). The openness of competition 
law authorities to the legitimacy of regulated conduct defences is essential for ensuring that 
companies are not placed in situations where they face inconsistent legal demands. The regulated 
                                                     
129 ICN (2002, p. 25). 
130 ICN (2002, pp.59-67). Also Cooper and Kovacic (2010, p.1581). 
131 See above footnotes 127 and 128. 
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conduct defence may, however, entail substantial welfare costs for society. Therefore, the courts 
should adopt a cautious approach when applying the defence. 
• Regulations can at times require actions that would, absent the regulation, constitute violations of 
competition law. (i) When regulation complements and pursues the same objectives as competition 
law (e.g., total or consumer welfare), regulated conduct is less likely to be at odds with competition 
law, assuming the regulation and competition law rigorously implement the common goal. (ii) 
When regulation restricts competition (e.g. by establishing entry barriers or fixing minimum 
prices), disputes may require weighing of different societal objectives.  
• The regulated conduct defence is a narrower form of immunity than exempting an entire sector 
from the application of competition law and permitting this defence should be preferred to broad, 
sector-wide exemptions from competition law. 
• The regulated conduct defence is based on several legal doctrines such as express immunity, 
implied immunity and the state action doctrine that have been developed pragmatically in the case-
law. Although the core principles are relatively clear in many jurisdictions, uncertainties remain. 
• The conditions of application of a regulated conduct defence depend on the hierarchy of norms. 
When competition law and regulation are at the same hierarchical level, the regulated conduct 
defence applies if one of the legal rules provides for competition law immunity (express immunity) 
or if there is a plain repugnancy in the application of both legal rules to the challenged conduct 
(implied immunity). In some jurisdictions, the defence also applies where there is no added-value 
in applying competition law in conjunction with regulation. When competition law is at a superior 
level to the regulation, the regulated conduct defence applies when the challenged conduct is 
imposed or at least actively supervised by the regulator.  
• The regulated conduct defence should only apply in cases where companies have no autonomy 
over their potentially anti-competitive actions. If a regulation strengthens or facilitates anti-
competitive behaviour without directly imposing specific conduct, a company’s conduct is open to 
discretion and competition laws should in principle apply to the regulated conduct. 
• In some jurisdictions competition rules enacted at the federal level prevent State regulators from 
imposing or facilitating a conduct that would otherwise violate the competition law.  
• The regulated conduct defence is sometimes used as a defence in merger cases on the basis that 
merged companies, even if they gained market power, would not be able to harm others due to 
access or price regulations, that constrain the ability to exercise market power. 
• Institutional settings can reduce potential inconsistencies between the design and the enforcement 
of regulatory structures and competition law, for example by (i) assessing competitive effects of 
regulations before the adoption of regulations, (ii) providing regulators with competition law 
enforcement powers or a competition authority with regulatory powers, (iii) ensuring mutual co-
operation between regulators and competition authorities through both formal and informal 
agreements and (iv) ensuring a consistent interpretation of regulatory and competition rules 
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